Even though the adoption of cloud computing is accelerating, enterprises are still reluctant to use cloud-based services for processing sensible data, due to security and privacy concerns. The PaaSword framework provides functionalities for encrypted and distributed storage and context-aware access control, leveraging security and trust of cloud infrastructures and services and ensuring the protection, privacy and integrity of the data stored in the cloud. For proving its applicability, usability, effectiveness and value, the PaaSword consortium is currently developing and evaluating five pilot integration projects, which consist of typical scenarios specific to the particular user communities of which the pilot partners are part of, including PaaS providers, governmental institutions, logistics industry and providers of business applications. After a short overview of the framework, we present in detail expectations and integration experiences for two of the pilots: "Protection of personal data in a multi-tenant CRM environment" and "Secure sensors data fusion and analytics".
INTRODUCTION
Gartner [5] predicts the Cloud Application Services market to grow 20% in 2017 and to double its size by 2018. Virtualizing IT resources in the cloud enables significant cost savings and accelerates the deployment of new applications and business models [3] . But at the same time, Cloud Computing is posing new data security and privacy challenges. Deploying confidential information in the Cloud raises concerns about its vulnerability to attack, theft, unauthorized exposure or manipulation. Moreover, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [1] defines significant legal consequences if data confidentiality is breached, or if Cloud providers inadvertently move sensitive information across European borders. In the frame of the H2020 1 project PaaSword [11] , a novel data privacy and security by design framework has been developed with the objective to protect sensitive data stored in the cloud. PaaSword extends the Cloud Security Alliance's cloud security principles by capitalizing on recent innovations in virtual database middleware technologies that introduce a scalable and secure cloud database abstraction layer with sophisticated data distribution and encryption methods. PaaSword provides encrypted and distributed storage as well as context-aware access control, constituting a valuable asset for developers or Cloud providers. For evaluation in real-life scenarios, PaaSword has defined five pilots, typical examples for particular user communities and their respective success criteria. In this paper, we will focus on two of the pilots, "Protection of personal data in a multi-tenant CRM environment", led by CAS Software, and "Secure sensors data fusion and analytics", led by SIEMENS. Since the authors are practitioners (working at CAS Software and Siemens), this workshop paper is based on their experiences made in the process of evaluating the framework from the developers perspective. Thus, our intention is to provide a proof of concept of the outcomes of the project. After an overview of the PaaSword framework we concentrate on our integration experiences gained within the two aforementioned pilots.
RELATED WORK
Recent efforts within the cloud and security community have focused on providing security and privacy mechanisms for deployments of data and application into third party infrastructures. The framework proposed by the SERECA (Secure Enclaves for Reactive Cloud Applications) project [13] allows the secure deployment and execution of sensitive code on untrusted cloud operators by employing Intel's new CPU extension: the Software Guard eXtension (SGX) 2 . Through SGX, [4] a secure environment, independent of the cloud's provider software and hardware stack, can be created, within which applications can be executed with minimal effort. This includes distributed applications, through its integration with the Docker container engine.
A similar approach is taken by the SecureCloud (Secure Big Data Processing in Untrusted Clouds) project [12] , which also employs Intel's SGX extensions in order to facilitate the execution of applications with high and very high security requirements on third party cloud infrastructures. In addition to SGX, SecureCloud plans to use OpenStack as a common stack infrastructure, to extend -similar to SERECA -container technologies, and to employ software-defined networks allowing the inter-connection of applications across one or multiple data centres. [7] MUSA (Multi-Cloud Secure Applications) [10] is a project with the primary goal of securing multi-cloud environments by a framework that enables security-intelligent lifecycle management of distributed applications. The project supports two industrial use cases such as data confidentiality and localization within a cloud based application used by airlines and the facilitation of the deployment of privacy and data protection within a cloud application for urban travelling that bases on open data [14] .
PAASWORD FRAMEWORK 3.1 Archtiectural overview
PaaSword is a holistic data privacy and security by design framework based on distributed and encrypted data persistence and sophisticated context-aware access control mechanisms in cloudbased services and applications. The framework supports both developers of cloud applications with code annotation techniques, and DevOps with the necessary modelling and management tools for achieving an appropriate level of protection of their cloud application's data, even in cases where sensitive information resides on untrusted Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS) providers.
The PaaSword architecture presented in Figure 1 depicts the platform's key components and their interconnectivity [17] [16] : (i) the PaaSword Context-aware Access Model , which conceptualizes the aspects which must be evaluated during the enforcement of data-access policies (i.e. allowance, denial). The access control models are therefore responsible for supporting the decision of 2 SGX by Intel (https://software.intel.com/en-us/sgx) whether a user has the right to access a certain object or to execute a certain action on a specific object -which can be a service, an object persisted in a database, an application etc; (ii) the PaaSword Policies Access, Decision and Enforcement Middleware, which maintains the access model, enables the annotation of data objects with access-conditioned descriptions, for controlling their validity, for their dynamic interpreation and, finally, for their enforcement at runtime; and (iii) the PaaSword Physical Distribution, Encryption and Query Middleware, representing the persistence layer which transparently encrypts and distributes the data among one or several cloud infrastructures.
Pilot applications and evaluation
Security is always a trade-off between costs, performance and usability. In order to evaluate the computational and technical overhead introduced by the PaaSword components, several pilot implementations are currently being developed. The implementations are driven by industrial pilot partners and cover specific requirements and evaluation criteria. More specifically, the applications developed represent industry branches such as (i) Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS) providers, (ii) governmental institutions, (iii) the logistics industry, (iv) and providers of business applications -in particular Customer Relationship Management (CRM)/Anything Relationship Management (xRM) or Enterprise Resource Planning(ERP). The corresponding evaluation criteria includes level of security, performance, applicability, interoperability and usability.
PROTECTION OF PERSONAL DATA IN A MULTI-TENANT CRM ENVIRONMENT
At CAS Software AG, the Java-based CRM/xRM cloud solution SmartWe is subject to the integration of the PaaSword framework. SmartWe allows both a mobile and a web client to access its key functionality and features such as:
• Upload and archive documents, • Manage and export addresses, e.g. as CSV,
• Start and manage campaigns, • Time recording, project management, • Communication, surveys and more. The use case is to protect personal and sensitive CRM data related to the above described categories and actions, by introducing an additional layer of security, based on context aware access control decisions. Although the mobile and the web client access the same data, the main focus shall be put on the mobile client. For both cases, communication happens against the OPEN server, a stateless CRM/xRM backend based on the Spring 3 framework and its technology stack. As the integration scenario focuses on the components of the PaaSword framework that provide context aware access control, the OPEN server and its access control rights system are the main parts of the SmartWe solution that are discussed in the paper. Here, the original access rights system of OPEN has to be extended in a way (Figure 2) , that allows the already existing execution flow to consider the users actual context (e.g. device type, location). As PaaSword assumes context informations to be already gathered, additional infrastructural components to provide such information are necessary. Once this is achieved, a users request to upload and archive a document or to export a set of addresses could easily be bound to a rule that demands a certain context (e.g. the users location has to be within Europe and the access has to be made within the companies working hours).
Technical Approach
As SmartWe is an already released product, precautionary measures are a necessity on both sides. Not only SmartWe needs to be extended in order to integrate PaaSword, but also the PaaSword components have to be slightly adapted to meet the requirements of the SmartWe code base and infrastructure. The integration will first be discussed regarding the overall high-level architecture, while relevant components will then be described in detail. Before an application can be secured by PaaSword, it has to be announced once to the PaaSword Controller in order to be correctly handled regarding its assigned model and policies. This is done by creating an entry within the PaaSword Controller, that specifies the app to be controlled. Besides the specification of general information such as name, version and root package 4 a binary/archive of the application to be secured needs to be uploaded to the PaaSword Controller. On the binary, an introspection is then performed in order to find annotated entities of type @PaaSword (4.1.4) that shall be controlled later. Once they are discovered each of them represents a Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) directly bound to the type (e.g. Policy) specified in the annotations parameter. The controlled objects are business operations (BOs) like DocumentCheckIn or DocumentCheckOut. As the OPEN server implements such BOs with the execute pattern, a BO represents a Java Class and the annotation is placed above each classes execute() method. PEPs are then created for each annotated method, which corresponds to a PEP per BO.
As SmartWe is deployed with a single WAR file (containing both OPEN Server and front end) on a Tomcat 5 server, it's complexity and internal dependencies are problematic, what not least results in a big file size (> 100MB). The PaaSword Controller default implementation loads and performs an actual class loading in order to perform the introspection, what leads to high memory consumption and dependency resolving issues in the pilot's case. The initial introspection is therefore replaced by an use case specific library, that scans for annotations by analysing the WAR file's byte code content.
PaaSword Library.
The PaaSword Library is the most essential component regarding the integration itself, as it allows the application to be secured (SmartWe) to execute parts of its business logic with context aware access rights. Technically, the PaaSword Library is a JAR file that handles the remote usage of the PaaSword Controllers API. Before being ready to be used, the Library has to be instantiated once with the physical address of the PaaSword Controller and a unique key, that was created during the configuration of the application by using the PaaSword Controllers front-end. The Library and the previously configured PaaSword Controller are now linked with each other. This link now is the basis for the BOs method calls to be forwarded to the PaaSword Controller and from there to the PaaSword Rule Engine. Once the engine has evaluated the current request against existing policies and the PaaSword Model, the decision is propagated back to the library and then as a return value back to the caller (e.g. SmartWe).
In the OPEN Server, an instance of PaaSword has to be defined (Listing 1) by calling the static method getInstance(). On the returned instance then authorization requests can be performed. In the pilot's use case, this request is always related to the type PaaSwordPEP, a certain policy name (identical with the policy that is later specified in the annotation parameter), the method to be controlled, the identity of the current user and the context of the the request. As the use case only controls method calls, the type to be used is always MethodInvocation. As the OPEN server is designed to work stateless and the business logic is shared between tenants (multi tenancy), the actual user (later referred to as subject) is resolved by calling the static method user() from the class SecurityContext. The last argument of authorizationRequest(..) allows the developer to pass in further informations as a JSON object related to the current scope or request.
The PaaSword Framework offers aspect oriented techniques for some use cases, that automatically perform the above described authorization request. Unfortunately the use case doesn't meet the requirements of the PaaSword framework in order to be able to make use of the annotation based method interception mechanism.
The authorization request has to be initiated in each method by calling and evaluating its result manually (4.1.4, Listing 2). P a a S w o r d S e r v i c e . g e t I n s t a n c e ( " l o c a l h o s t " , " 00 b3 . . " )
. a u t h o r i z a t i o n R e q u e s t ( PaaSwordPEP , " p o l i c y 1 " , " p a c k a g e . b o c l a s s . e x e c u t e ( ) " , S e c u r i t y C o n t e x t . u s e r ( ) , " M e t h o d I n v o c a t i o n " , n u l l ) ;
Listing 1: Using the PaaSword Library.
4.1.4 OPEN Server. The OPEN Server is the CRM/xRM backend used within the SmartWe solution and represents the part of the application to be secured, that actively uses the PaaSword Library in order to cut or follow access decisions based on the servers own logic. If, for instance, a user can initiate the download of an archived file Document-X (handled by BO DocumentCheckOut), the access rights for that user regarding Document-X are evaluated by the OPEN Server. Only if the evaluation results in ALLOW, the document can actually be checked out and then downloaded by the user that requested it.
Given that the user is allowed to checkout a certain document, the contextual information now has to match the defined constraints imposed by the data or app owner. This is the moment where the PaaSword Library is used to initiate the authorization request. As the execute() methods of BOs represent PEPs, the decision of an authorization request needs to be enforced inside each of these methods. Cutting or following access decisions made by the OPEN Server can be seen from a technical perspective as interrupting the method execution or executing it as designed. In the example code listed in Listing 2 the following scenario is covered:
• Control execution of DocumentCheckOut by placing the @PaaSwordPEP annotation, assign filePolicy1 to secure the PEP, • Resolve PaaSword instance that controls the application by passing physical address and unique application key as arguments, • Do authorization request for type PaaSwordPEP, bound to policy filePolicy1, triggered by current method ReflectionTools.getScopeMethod() and for current user • According to the result of the authorization request, an exception is thrown or the method execution continues, • The rules behind filePolicy1, defined by using the Web App/GUI of the PaaSword Controller, (4.1.2), now affects the execution of the BO DocumentCheckOut.
@PaaSwordPEP ( t y p e =PaaSwordPEP . Type . POLICY , v a l u e = " f i l e P o l i c y 1 " ) p u b l i c R e s p o n s e O b j e c t e x e c u t e ( f i n a l C h e c k O u t F i l e R e q u e s t r e q ) throws B u s i n e s s E x c e p t i o n , D a t a L a y e r E x c e p t i o n , C o n t e x t S e c u r i t y E x c e p t i o n { S t r i n g r e s u l t = P a a S w o r d S e r v i c e . g e t I n s t a n c e ( " l o c a l h o s t " , " 00 b3 . . " ) . a u t h o r i z a t i o n R e q u e s t ( PaaSwordPEP , " f i l e P o l i c y 1 " , R e f l e c t i o n T o o l s . g e t S c o p e M e t h o d ( ) , S e c u r i t y C o n t e x t . u s e r ( ) , " M e t h o d I n v o c a t i o n " , n u l l ) ;
i f ( r e s u l t . e q u a l s I g n o r e C a s e ( " deny " ) ) { throw new C o n t e x t S e c u r i t y E x c e p t i o n ( ) ; } return new C h e c k O u t F i l e R e s p o n s e ( . . ) ; } Listing 2: Manipulating the execution of a BO in the OPEN Server. Additional functionality can be added in the form of plugins, e.g. to apply static rules on a set of context data regarding its chronological sequence in order to detect context pattern. Such a pattern might be fraudulent IP spoofing, after a subjects or requests IP address changed more than n times in a given period of time. The Context Agent reads the related sensors and sends the data related to the subject (user) to the Context Service. Parameters like the interval, IP address of context service and credentials can be configured. Such a configuration set as well as control commands (START, PAUSE, STOP) are transferred from the SmartWe client app to the Context Agent background service by using a TCP socket. This allows the client app to remain the single point of interaction from the user's perspective ( Figure 5 ). The decision against the integration of the context gathering in the client app itself was made due to the requirement of having the context service reusable and maintainable apart from the client apps code base. A big challenge that has to be taken in future iterations is to strengthen the authenticity of the device and sensor information the Context Agent reads from the operating system, i.e. Android.
SmartWe Client.
The SmartWe Mobile Client needs the fewest adaptations, as it can mainly be seen as the interface a user uses when accessing SmartWe. The now context aware access control system of the OPEN Server potentially affects executed business logic from both, the VAADIN Web Client and the Mobile Client for smartphones. In order to demonstrate the integration on only one device, the Mobile Client is the better choice as it furthermore ensures that user context describes the current session. To allow users to use any combination of Context Agent and (Web) Client, a session verification would be necessary. It is conceivable, that a future iteration introduces, for example, a session specific QR code which the user has to scan from the Web Client by using his mobile device running the Context Agent. Based on that link, a user session would now be bound again to a certain set of user sensitive context informations.
For the direct use on Microsoft Windows machines an experimental desktop client based on C#/WinForms is available. The desktop client's context gathering is limited to a few sensors and informations, that most of latest personal computers and laptops offer:
• WiFi and Bluetooth, • IP and MAC address of various network adapters, • CPU serial number, attached devices.
SECURE SENSOR DATA FUSION AND ANALYTICS
The usecase implemented by the pilot is specific to a secure sensor data fusion and analytics transport scenario. More specifically, within this scenario, a smart-X context is assumed, in which a fine grained ICT monitoring system composed of mobile wireless sensors, part of a large, distributed, heterogeneous IoT sensor network, is actively tracking, analysing and reporting the state of transferred goods (among a plethora of other tasks specific to the smart cities, transportation or health scenarios enabled by IoT deployments).
As part of the scenario, goods are transported from suppliers to retailers directly or through intermediary warehouses. The sensor systems' task is the continuous monitoring of the transport conditions of the goods while in transit: implied through transit meaning either while being loaded, while being transported in containers, or while residing at intermediary positions like the aforementioned warehouses. The near real-time analysis of the data provided by such a monitoring system enables, for example, a retailer to get a confirmation that a shipment of temperature, humidity or shock sensitive goods can be accepted -such as medicines, fruits or sensitive electronics equipment. In addition, it also enables the transporter or logistics team to proactively engage and automatically adjust transport condition in order to reduce product spoilage or damage (and associated processes such as insurance claims) through a timely analysis of the changes in the local data or outside conditions (e.g. temperature changes, traffic conditions etc.) and them triggering appropriate measurements.
More generally, the use case demonstrates the following:
• Generation of acceptance reports: the system enables the receiver of goods to have detailed reports on their conditions during transport and storage. A decision whether they should be accepted or not can then be made, by both the receiver and transporter.
• Generation of real-time alerts or early warnings: the system is able to provide early warnings to transporters and logistics chains when the products are drifting outside their optimum storage or transportation conditions, enabling them to act by quickly adjusting the conditions before any damage occurs.
• Enabling automatic control of storage and transport conditions: Since the system has knowledge of what conditions are required for products within a warehouse or a truck, an automatic environmental control meant to maintain optimum conditions can act in a timely manner by adjusting certain parameters like coolers or HVAC systems, humidifiers, etc.
Finally, in addition to the analytics performed on the data during its transportation and storage through IoT monitoring, the scenario also requires strict authorization controls and privacy enforcement points for the information available on the goods, their type, their sender, their destination or potential value loss.
Within the rest of this section, the relevant architectural and functional components will be presented and detailed. Figure 6 presents an architectural view of the pilot consisting of the main functional components and their interconnections.
Technical Approach
From a distribution point of view, it consists of components acting at three distinct layers: (i) a local, sensor network layer, (ii) a cloud-based middleware layer, and (iii) a (remote) application layer consisting of platform users and their interactions with the system.
Local Gateways.
The local gateways (sometimes called a "sink") represent the collection and transmission points of sensor data towards the storage and processing components within the cloud. At a hardware level, a local gateway does not have to significantly differ from a standard sensing node, with a single notable exception -it being able to communicate with an external system, i.e. through an Internet connection. In addition, we assume that the gateway, due to its higher energy requirements imposed by having to communicate externally, is not running on battery power alone. In many cases, in case of tree-like routing algorithms such as RPL [2] , the gateway will also play the role of network coordinator and root node, it being the destination for all or most of the messages being routed within the local sensor network.
Virtual Object Registry. The Virtual Object Registry (VOR)
contains two distinct formalized abstractions: those of the sensors of which the underlying sensor network consists (virtual sensors, VS), and that of the traceable goods which represent the tracked feature of interest (FOI or virtual entity, VE). Technically, registries are triple stores containing a homogeneous, semantically enriched description of the two entities types.
The virtual sensors are therefore semantically described abstractions of real devices, which detail only the relevant features and their addressable services. The services provide information on accessing model information (e.g. temperature sensor, humidity sensor), on the sensed values and their properties (e.g. temperature measured every 90 seconds with a certain accuracy), battery power readings, firmware information, as well as access and privacy policies.
The feature of interest (or virtual entity) represent a physical or geographical entity which is being observed or manipulated (through actuators) by virtual sensors.
The main relatable entity, therefore, within the VOR is the FOI, and not the VS. This is reflected also in the supported queries of the VOR, which are mainly FOI-based. E.g., "Provide temperature readings for the FOI identified by 38792342/at geographical position... " is a typical query.
Complex Event
Processing. The complex event processing unit (CEP) enables the execution of (complex) functions on the data received by the system from the various sensors. The information can be refined, filter, and inferred towards generating predictions, monitoring and control statements.
Readings Persistency.
The role of the VOR is to store only VS and FOI abstract information, and gets updated only with each new registration of such a virtual object type. The Readings Persistency (RP) component is where all the instances and readings from the underlying sensor network are stored and retrieved by each run of the CEP component. The data is being stored for a limited timestorage time which is dictated by two features: first, it is dictated by each node, through its policies (e.g. a node may allow the data to be stored indefinitely, for a short period, or not at all) and by its relevance. E.g., shock sensor readings during data being transported by a logistics company which does not exist anymore can be discarded. General temperature and humidity readings at a geographical level, as well as road conditions (measured through shock sensors, for example), are of high importance for a self-maintaining prevention system, and can be stored in order for the system to be able to predict typical transport developments for a certain road section.
Besides the time limitation, the dynamic nature of the system imposes also a considerable amount of updates being pushed: changes in measured temperature, responsible transporter or logistics team, geographical movement or factors, all require immediate updates within the RP.
Technically, due to these changes and the amount of a data produces, NoSQL technology is preferred over traditional relational databases.
Receiver and Sender
Tracker. The two trackers represent proof-of-concept clients, registered within the system with specific requirements which are executed within the CEP.
In addition to these functional components, four distinct PaaSword components are also part of the architecture, with an enforcement role:
5.1.6 The PaaSword Secure Database Adapter. The secure database adapter provides a secure storage option for data at rest and in transit. The VOR contains non-sensitive information -more specifically, the FOIs and VEs are describing general type of sensors and entities. Their mappings to distinct entities is performed within the Readings Persistency.
More specifically, the VOR can be considered to be a kind of template or a metadata repository (similar to the approach described in [9] ), while the RP represents actual instances of VOs (accessible through the mechanisms defined in the VOR) detailing concrete IPv6 addressing of nodes, or the exact location of a package are considered temporary data, being updated continuously, and stored therefore within the RP. This type of information is highly sensible and implies storing of confidential information, where encryption and distribution are required.
PaaSword Policy Enforcement Points.
The processing of the incoming data by the CEP and its outcome is based on the instance-relevant information provided by the nodes. Policy data, stored within the RP and assigned to each data producer (VSs) and FOIs, needs to be considered when generating prediction, monitoring or control reports. More specifically, the access to the reports needs to be enforced. The dynamic interpretation of policies, their validation and their enforcement is done per each request of the trackers through the PaaSword-enabled framework. If efficiency is required, the pilot also supports a lease-timebased approach, in which, once a request is validated, subsequent request from the same individual (direct user of automated software component) is directly approved if within a certain time-frame (i.e. 15 minutes). This allows the system to handle aggressive queries towards the middleware component. An important note to make is that the amount of queries performed to the exposed services does not influence the rate of which the data is being transmitted by the sensors -the prediction mechanisms within the CEP, however, might produce results based on other contextual or historical facts which can be updated or added (inferred) with a nondeterministic frequency.
5.1.8 Context and Security Models. The context and security models represent additional enforcement-related information, provided by the sender and receiver trackers and which also contribute to the generation of dynamic access control responses.
In particular, the system relies on tracking goods being shipped through a system with a complex owner structure. The sensors monitoring transport conditions are a heterogeneous mix of hardware and with multiple owners and policies defining access to their data. In addition, the object being monitored by the system has itself a current and a future owner. Both of which may dictate various access policies on the information of its state. The receiver, for example, might delegate the task of tracking or accepting the package to someone else, e.g. a family member, neighbour or an expert being able to take a more objective decision regarding the state of the goods.
These policies regarding access of data and of delegating access are stored within contextual and security models, which are at the disposal of the two entities (receiver, tracker) and which can be modified anytime during the shipping process.
5.1.9 Key Management Mechanisms. In addition to the context and security models dictating the context within which access to the information is allowed, the end-users need to authenticate and provide the system with a proper key required to access the package-specific information stored within the RP. Without the required key information, the system would have only access to the VS provided information, which is a "transparent" source of readings regarding the state of relevant FOIs. The FOI information, however, is encrypted with the keys belonging to its owner(s) -any interaction of the system with the data, therefore, requires the owner(s) to provide the access to the relevant information.
6 CONCLUSION 6.1 Protection of personal data in a multi-tenant CRM environment
The integration of the PaaSword framework into an already existing CRM/xRM cloud solution such as SmartWe has been done by adapting some very use case specific parts of PaaSword. The integration profited from the good adaptability of the PaaSword framework 8 . Due to its modular structure, major adaptations such as a) the use of explicit authorization request calls and b) the modification of the introspection process could be handled without interfering with other functionality.
To fully support the processing of actual context information that describe a user's current environment and access situation such as geolocation, device and network, the existing infrastructure of the SmartWe deployment had to be extended by individual components that are not part of the PaaSword framework itself. These components were the context gathering (4.1.6) and the context persistence (4.1.5). As PaaSword uses ReST endpoints for the context handlers, the already existing ReST interface of the Context Service could easily be adapted to the handlers concrete endpoint signature. This level of interoperability reduced potential efforts on the adaptations of the exchange protocol to the absolute minimum.
With a reasonable overall effort the successful integration of PaaSword in SmartWe now allows CAS Software AG to regulate access to sensitive data according to a users actual context. Given that, the use case scenarios specified by CAS Software AG in [8] are widely covered by the outcome of the PaaSword project in general and the pilots demonstrator in particular.
Secure Sensor Data Fusion and Analytics
Section 5.1 has presented an overview of the SIEMENS pilot architecture, including the description of the security and privacy components and their relevance for the data registration, processing and retrieval operations. In this section, a description of its impact on the overall system from a technical as well as an enduser perception point of view is presented.
Security and privacy in IoT and cloud-storage/processing environments is currently a highly active research topic. One reason being the fact that end users (be it individuals or companies) require higher security and privacy guarantees in what their actions and their data is concerned. Key aspects within security requirements mainly refer to data confidentiality, while the key aspect related to privacy relates to retaining partial or complete data ownership. Incidentally, satisfying both requirements leads to a higher trust of a user in the platform he interacts with.
The mechanisms provided by the PaaSword platform and incorporated into the pilot are meant to leverage this overall trust by enforcing such key points as:
• Data confidentiality (at rest and transit) through its encryption within the NoSql data-store with the data owner's key, 8 Accessible as modularized Spring Boot Maven Project
• Modelling of access policies by the data generator and the data owners, • Modelling of contextual models defining the conditions in which the data is to be stored, • Key management system allowing (temporary) data access rights delegation by the data owner to other interested, trusted parties. Evidently, decrypting, evaluating and enforcing security and privacy policies on (almost) every service request is expected to have an impact on overall performance of the system: its responsiveness, scalability, throughput, and data transmission time are bound to increase due to the added processing required by the mechanisms. It is within the scope of the on-going pilot to evaluate the effect of PaaSword from such a technical point of view. At the same time it is within the scope of the pilot to quantify the advantages provided by leveraging the trust and the flexibility of available components (e.g. users being free to define their own access policies) -for example, by considering nonfunctional requirements such as maintainability with respect to current or upcoming security and privacy regulations (such as the GDPR) [1] ; results will be presented in future work.
Overall
As the concrete use case scenario of each pilot partner demands its own, domain and application specific adaptations, both pilots profit from the adaptability of the PaaSword framework. All relevant components and models of the PaaSword framework are easy to use, functional complete, reliable and well documented. In the scenario of SIEMENS, features such as database encryption and key management are used, while the implementation of the CAS use case focused on the context aware security mechanism. Combining both pilot's outcome satisfies the majority of the use case requirements that were described in the projects early phase [8] . In both cases, the targeted goal of securing an already existing piece of software could finally be reached and individual challenges be documented.
FUTURE WORK
A full evaluation along the methodology described in [15] will be performed and reported within future publications. With these results both the quality of the additional security and the overall usability of the integration scenarios resulting application (accessible by the end user) regarding e.g. performance can be assessed.
